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Abstract 
 
Nurses and pharmacists gained the right to prescribe as independent 
prescribers in the UK in 2007. Independent prescribers are responsible for 
the initial assessment of patients with diagnosed and undiagnosed 
conditions. Public policy discourse and the views expressed by health care 
professionals have conceptualised diagnostic decision making as being at 
a  ‘higher  level’  and  more  difficult  than  prescribing  decision  making.  This  
paper presents five themes related to this premise. Firstly diagnostic 
decision making is put into the broader context of clinical reasoning which 
underpins all types of clinical decisions including both diagnostic and 
prescribing decisions. Secondly, the nature of diagnostic decision making 
is discussed as to whether it is indeed separable from the prescribing 
decision making process. Thirdly, the conception that all diagnostic 
decisions are inherently more difficult is contested when difficulty in 
decision making is more appropriately applied to all types of clinical 
decisions which involve greater complexity and uncertainty. The fourth 
topic concerns whether this perception of diagnoses as being more difficult 
is a response by the medical profession to the threat of independent 
prescribing, reflecting their wish to maintain professional power and 
dominance over other professions. The final section considers how 
expertise in diagnoses could be developed in nurse and pharmacist 
independent prescribers. To develop their expertise in making accurate 
diagnoses, medicine uses the model of learning basic science mechanisms 
followed by engagement with patient clinical problems followed by years 
of clinical experience. However this may be just one way of achieving 
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diagnostic expertise. Other approaches, such as the use of deliberate 
practice and feedback, may be more suitable to the diverse range of 
knowledge and experiences of nurse and pharmacist prescribers.    
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Introduction 
 
In the UK, appropriately trained nurses and pharmacists have been able 
to legally sign prescriptions for prescription-only medicines since 2004. 
This followed from the Crown Report in 1999 which recommended that the 
‘legal  authority  to  prescribe  should  extend  beyond  currently  authorised  
prescribers’  (Department  of  Health,  1999,  pp.  36).  Legislative  changes  in  
2003 led to the extension of prescribing authority to nurses and 
pharmacists with the introduction of supplementary prescribing in 2004 
(Department of Health, 2005) and with further legal changes in 2006, to 
allow nurse and pharmacist independent prescribing in 2007 (Department 
of Health, 2006). Previously both nurses and pharmacists had been able 
to advise medical practitioners on medicine use and, particularly in 
community pharmacies, to provide advice on over-the-counter medicines. 
However these changes were a major shift in policy which enabled health 
care professionals, other than a doctor or dentist, to have legal authority 
to write prescriptions for the full range of prescription-only medicines 
including, for nurses, controlled drugs. The aims of these developments 
were to give patients quicker access to medicines, to decrease general 
practitioners’  workload  and  to  better  use  the  skills  of  nurses  and  
pharmacists (Department of Health, 2005). 
  
Supplementary  prescribing  is  described  as  ‘a voluntary partnership 
between the responsible independent prescriber (a doctor or a dentist) 
and a supplementary prescriber (nurse or pharmacist) to implement an 
agreed  patient  specific  clinical  management  plan  with  the  patient’s  
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 5 
agreement’  (Department  of  Health,  2005,  pp.11).  The  clinical  
management plan details, amongst other issues, the types of medicines to 
be prescribed, limitations or restrictions on prescribing, relevant warnings 
and the circumstances under which the supplementary prescriber should 
refer or seek advice from the independent prescriber. In 2006, 
independent prescribing (IP) by nurses and pharmacists was introduced 
with  the  independent  prescriber  defined  as  the  ‘practitioner responsible 
and accountable for the assessment of patients with undiagnosed or 
diagnosed conditions and for decisions about the clinical management 
required, including prescribing’ (Department of Health, 2006, pp.2). As 
independent prescribers, nurses and pharmacists are no longer required 
to use clinical management plans, although many in practice will use 
condition-specific protocols or guidelines to inform, and limit, the range of 
medicines they feel competent to prescribe.   
 
Anxieties raised by doctors to these new roles have centred on concerns 
about patient safety and that nurses and pharmacists lack training in 
diagnosing (British Medical Association, 2005; Day 2005). More moderate 
medical voices have expressed a need for appropriate training, support 
and governance for new prescribers but that it could benefit patients 
(Avery & Pringle, 2005). Other authors expressed fears over new 
prescribers taking on a diagnostic role and that patients could be 
endangered  by  ‘the  reckless  expansion  of  nurse  and  pharmacist  
prescribing’  (Anonymous,  2006).  Making  diagnoses  has  been  called  the  
most important responsibility carried out by medical doctors (Gutkin, 
2009) and that diagnosis is almost the only skill that still defines them 
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(Godlee, 2008). On the other hand, the changes in the types of activities 
traditionally carried out by doctors and nurses have been noted by 
Ghislaine Young, a nurse practitioner and salaried partner in a GP practice 
(Young, 2005). She has argued that the distinction between medicine 
(diagnosis and cure) and nursing (care) has become increasingly blurred 
and, further, that professional groups should work together to enhance 
the care of patients.  
 
Research exploring the views of medical doctors about nurse and 
pharmacist prescribing have found that, although they were generally 
positive about the role of new prescribers, some expressed concern about 
nurses’  and  pharmacists’  ability  to  diagnose  (Child  &  Cantrill, 1999, Bissell 
et al., 2008, Stewart et al., 2009, Weiss et al., 2006). Doctors acting as 
mentors for pharmacist prescribers expressed concern about boundary 
encroachment and medical deskilling. They preferred the model of 
supplementary prescribing where they could retain ultimate control over 
the process by setting barriers within which pharmacists could prescribe 
(Lloyd & Hughes, 2007). Similar views were expressed by doctors working 
in secondary care who wanted to set limits to nurse and pharmacist 
prescribing by only allowing them to work within protocols (Buckley et al. 
2006).  In  Bissell’s  (2008)  study,  diagnosing  by  doctors  was  considered  to  
be  a  ‘more  skilled,  uncertain  and  difficult  task’  with  prescribing  seen  as  a  
lesser  task  than  ‘de  novo’ diagnosis (Bissell et al., 2008, pp. 57). Evidence 
from the evaluation of nurse and pharmacist supplementary prescribing 
suggested that prescribing was considered by doctors to have diminished 
as a skilled practice and, with the widespread use of protocols, much of it 
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was considered routine. These doctors saw their role, with its superior 
knowledge, training and experience, to be reserved for diagnosis and plus 
ultra prescribing (Cooper et al., 2011).  
 
Views of nurse and pharmacist prescribers in previous research have 
echoed similar reservations about diagnosis. In an evaluation of 
pharmacist supplementary prescribing, while many new prescribers were 
keen to become independent prescribers, the reason for this was not so 
they could diagnose, but rather so they could avoid the need for individual 
patient clinical management plans. Some of these new prescribers had no 
desire to take on the diagnosis of new conditions and felt unqualified to do 
so  (Lloyd  et  al.,  2010,  Weiss  et  al.,  2006).  In  Luker’s  early  evaluation  of 
nurse prescribing, nurses expressed fear about making an incorrect 
diagnosis, although this research took place before the introduction of 
supplementary prescribing and was during the time when nurses were 
able to prescribe from a limited formulary (Luker et al., 1997).   
  
Supplementary prescribing may have been more acceptable to doctors 
given the framework in which it was conducted with patient-specific 
clinical management plans. This arrangement allows doctors to retain 
control over the process (hence the earlier word used for supplementary 
prescriber  was  a  ‘dependent’  prescriber)  and  circumscribed  the  area  of  
clinical practice for the new prescriber (Lloyd & Hughes, 2007). The word 
supplementary implies something both sub-ordinate and non-essential. In 
this sense both context and terminology are important. In policy 
documents the distinction between supplementary prescribing and 
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independent prescribing created an explicit hierarchy between diagnostic 
decision making and prescribing decision making, privileging the 
superiority of diagnosis as a cognitive decision making process. The 
responses of health care professionals noted above reinforce this 
distinction and suggest that such an assumption may be pervasive. There 
are several issues, related to this concern about diagnostic decision 
making, that this paper seeks to address: (1) to provide some background 
into what is meant by diagnostic decision making and how this relates to 
broader issues of clinical reasoning, (2) to consider whether diagnostic 
decision making is truly able to be regarded as a separate process distinct 
from prescribing, and other, patient management decision making, (3) to 
suggest  that  it  may  be  more  appropriate  to  focus  on  ‘difficult’  clinical  
decisions, which includes diagnostic as well as other patient management 
decisions, rather than diagnostic decisions per sé, (4) to consider the 
threat to the medical profession posed by nurse and pharmacist 
independent prescribers who may wish to diagnose and, finally (5) to 
explore educational and cognitive psychology perspectives on the 
development of diagnostic expertise amongst nurse and pharmacist 
prescribers.  
 
While prescribing by allied health care professionals has also been 
implemented, this paper will explicitly take the perspective of nurse and 
pharmacist prescribing in a UK primary care setting.  
 
Diagnostic Decision Making 
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Elstein and Schwartz describe diagnosis as a process of generating one or 
more hypotheses, using these to predict what additional findings should 
be present and undertaking further data collection to test out these 
hypotheses (Elstein & Schwartz, 2002). This hypothetico-deductive 
approach generates hypotheses early during the initial presentation of a 
problem and draws upon existing knowledge, associations and experience 
of the medical doctor (Round, 2000). This process of generating 
hypotheses and drawing upon existing knowledge, associations and 
experience is part of the process of clinical reasoning (Norman et al., 
2009). Clinical reasoning also informs other kinds of clinical decisions 
including decisions about management such as treatment or referral 
decisions as well as the interpretation, and weight given to, clinical 
research evidence. Experience and knowledge both inform clinical 
reasoning and are influenced by previous applications of it. For the 
purposes of this paper, clinical reasoning will be used as the broader term 
and the underlying process informing all types of clinical decisions 
including diagnostic decisions, as well as prescribing decisions, referral 
decisions or other decisions about management. Clinical reasoning is 
usually seen as encompassing both analytic and non-analytic processes, 
both of which will be reviewed here. 
 
In the analytic model, medical work is seen as a logical, step by step 
cognitive process such that when a doctor is confronted with a particular 
patient situation, details of the patient problem are compared with 
professional knowledge. In this model the key elements are the 
professional’s  knowledge,  cognitive  capacities  and limitations and the data 
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required for diagnosis and intervention (Berg, 1997). This analytic 
approach characterises the decision as a two-stage process. The first 
stage consists of collecting and analysing the evidence with regard to 
benefits, harms and costs of each potential outcome option. The second 
stage consists of comparing the desirability of the different outcomes of 
each option (Eddy, 1990). In the analytic model, these processes are 
performed explicitly or implicitly, may be subject to imperfect clinical 
information and (if so) are likely to require subjective professional 
judgement.  Analytic  models  include  those  which  use  Bayes’  Theorem,  
where a priori probabilities associated with the known prevalence of a 
diagnosis and the conditional probabilities associated with each sign or 
symptom with each diagnosis are used to calculate the probability of each 
diagnosis under consideration (Elstein & Schwartz, 2002; Eva, 2004). This 
approach assumes that causal rules linking clinical features to diagnoses 
can be extracted from clinical practice and that, with experience, these 
rules can become more refined and attuned to reality (Eva, 2004). 
 
The non-analytic model, which comprises pattern recognition or direct 
automatic retrieval models, compares a current patient situation to past 
patient cases (or abstractions of such) to make a judgement as to the 
probability that a particular case belongs to a specific diagnostic category. 
A new case is categorised by its resemblance to memories of instances 
previously seen (Brooks et al., 1991) or to a more abstract prototype 
(Elstein & Schwartz, 2002). While usually termed a non-analytic model, a 
more accurate description may be that such reasoning is rapid and 
unconscious/subconscious, but nonetheless still analytic. Some authors 
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suggest that the ability to use pattern recognition increases with 
experience and expertise, as novice decision makers have no experience 
to draw upon (Luker et al., 1998) but rather base their decisions on 
taught procedures and guidelines (Benner, 1982). Novices think 
analytically through guiding principles whereas experts can make 
decisions  ‘intuitively’  through  rapid,  unconscious  or  subconscious  analytic  
processes. However other research has shown no qualitative difference 
between the reasoning strategies used by junior medical students 
compared with experienced doctors (Neufeld et al., 1981).    
 
The interplay between age (or clinical experience) and clinical reasoning is 
complex. A systematic review of the relationship between clinical 
experience and quality of care found that increasing experience resulted in 
a decline in performance as measured by physician clinical knowledge, 
adherence to guidelines and in some patient outcomes (Choudhry, et al., 
2005). Other evidence suggests that increasing age may result in 
increased non-analytic thinking without a loss of diagnostic accuracy (Eva 
et al., 2010; Groves et al., 2003). More experienced doctors may be more 
likely to consider less common or less stereotypical conditions and more 
able to integrate complex, social and behavioural information (Feltovich 
1981; Elstad et al., 2010). However age can also result in reliance on data 
gathered early in the consultation and less willingness to re-assess a 
diagnostic decision when presented with new information (Eva & 
Cunnington, 2006).   
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Recently Norman et al. (2009) have developed the idea of iterative 
diagnosis which draws upon elements from both the analytic and non-
analytic models of reasoning. Drawing upon the original hypo-thetico-
deductive model by Elstein and Schwartz (2002), the process involves the 
clinician generating hypotheses (often impressionistically using non-
analytic reasoning). These are then iteratively tested through additional 
patient questioning for their alignment with the clinician’s  clinical  
knowledge and experience using analytical reasoning. According to 
Norman et al. (2009) analytic and non-analytic reasoning usually 
integrate smoothly and unconsciously throughout the decision making 
process and subsequent consultation interaction. 
 
The literature on clinical reasoning recognises that human beings are 
subject to cognitive biases or errors through the use of heuristics or 
cognitive shortcuts which try to make the complex more simple (Hall, 
2002). Heuristics can be seen as a highly adaptive and appropriate 
response to complex decision making in the real world. However heuristics 
are more often viewed negatively and seen as the process through which 
clinical evidence becomes biased or weighted inappropriately. Authors 
acknowledge that heuristics are most commonly employed when making 
judgements under uncertainty (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974, Hall 2002). 
These include the availability bias where the probability of an event (or 
diagnosis) occurring is rated more likely if it can be related to a case 
easily recalled. There is the confirmation bias which directs the line of 
questioning towards confirming the diagnosis under consideration instead 
of investigating evidence which may refute it (Norman et al., 2009). A 
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third example is the framing bias where patients are swayed to give 
answers to questions which support a diagnosis because of the way in 
which a particular question has been asked. The consequence of these 
biases can be an inaccurate diagnosis due to premature closure of 
questioning without the critical data having been collected (Norman et al., 
2009).  
 
Hamm (1988) views analytic and non-analytic clinical reasoning as being 
on a continuum while more recent experts suggest that the optimal form 
of reasoning is an additive model in which both analytic and non-analytic 
processes play a role (Eva, 2004). However, as noted by Eva, accuracy of 
diagnoses relies not only on being able to draw upon a range of analytic 
and non-analytic strategies, but also the context within which a problem is 
encountered. Context in this sense includes the clinical setting, recent 
cases and personal factors such as clinician experience and the current 
state of medical opinion (Eva, 2004). The influence of social and 
psychological factors (e.g. patient recently bereaved, consultation before 
a  holiday  weekend)  on  doctors’  decision  making  has  been  widely  
recognised (Howie, 1976; Katz, 1985), as has the importance of 
considering how social, psychological and biological systems influence 
diagnostic certainty (Lutfey & McKinlay, 2009). 
 
Having considered some of the key features of the clinical reasoning 
process, I will now consider the intertwined nature of how diagnostic and 
prescribing decisions are made.  
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Diagnostic and Prescribing Decision Making 
 
Howie (1972) was one of the first investigators to hypothesise that a 
treatment decision might be derived directly from signs, symptoms and 
investigations without the intervening stage of a diagnostic decision. 
Conventional wisdom suggested a sequential process involving a 
diagnostic  decision  followed  by  a  treatment  decision  but  Howie’s  radical  
proposition was that a diagnostic label was less a reason for treatment but 
rather a justification for it (Howie, 1972). Howie found that diagnostic 
labels had a poorer predictive value for antibiotic treatment than the 
original symptoms-sign complex. In a follow-up study using simulated 
patients, Howie found that doctors required less information to make a 
decision on management than to make a diagnostic decision (Howie, 
1974). He notes that a decision to prescribe an antibiotic relates less to a 
decision on diagnosis but rather to a decision not to prescribe an 
antibiotic. Indeed, non-analytic reasoning may play a part in such 
processes where diagnoses are generated impressionistically (and 
potentially unconsciously) and are used to inform clinical management 
decisions. However these findings also suggest that there is not a 
separate process of clinical reasoning used to inform diagnostic decisions 
which is distinct from those processes informing the decision to prescribe. 
Privileging the aspect of clinical reasoning which informs diagnostic 
decisions, as noted in the comments by the medical profession described 
earlier, may not be appropriate given that these same processes inform 
decisions to prescribe. 
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Further evidence of the complex relationship between diagnostic and 
treatment  decision  making  comes  from  Bloor’s  study  of  ENT  specialists  
(Bloor,  1976;;  Bloor,  1978).  He  found  that  ENT  specialists’,  when  assessing  
children’s  suitability for possible adeno-tonsillectomy surgery, did not 
make decisions by considering and weighing up all the available 
information. Rather the specialists used a series of specifically situated 
routines  which  were  used  ‘to construct images of the clinical signs, 
symptoms  and  circumstances  of  each  patient’  (Bloor, 1976, pp.45). These 
routines, which varied widely between each specialist, were the means by 
which  they  rendered  ‘unproblematic  their  decisions  on  patient  disposal’  
(Bloor, 1976, pp.45). For example, the specialists differed in what signs 
were considered important, how important these signs were weighted, 
how specific and extensive their search procedures were and the decision 
rules used to denote whether or not surgery was indicated. Other general 
properties of decision making noted by Bloor were its repetitive, routinised 
and idiosyncratic nature, and its orientation towards action (Bloor, 1978). 
Evidence-based medicine can be seen as a development which sought to 
address this variability in specialists’  use  of  routines.  In  addition  these  
findings suggest there may be considerable overlap in the processes of 
clinical reasoning used to make diagnostic and management decisions.   
 
The intertwined nature of diagnosis and treatment decisions was also 
found by Berg (1992) in his ethnographic study of medical action in 
practice. He noted that the phased two-step motion of searching for a 
diagnosis and then deciding upon treatment did not hold. The process of 
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transforming the presenting patient problem into a solvable patient 
problem is: 
 
‘uni-directionally geared towards the construction of disposal. 
‘Diagnosis’  and  ‘therapy’  are  terms  which  can  be  applied  to  this  
process  in  retrospect,  but  in  an  ‘in  situ’  study  of  medical  practice  the  
usage of these terms creates an artefactual distinction’  (pp.169).   
 
Berg describes how medical disposals are socially constructed such that 
the  type  of  questions  asked,  the  way  they  are  asked  and  the  doctor’s  
interpretation  of  the  patient’s  answers  shape  the  symptoms,  historical and 
examination patient data towards a solvable problem. Patient data is 
recast and reconstructed into a pattern which aligns with the considered 
transformation. Some patient data may be ignored, devalued or 
emphasised in the course of medical interaction in the quest towards 
constructing a medical disposal (Berg, 1992). This may be because 
doctors have generated diagnostic hypotheses through non-analytic 
reasoning and these are (unconsciously) guiding their selective use, and 
emphasis on, patient data. Atkinson (1995) similarly noted the social and 
interactional nature of medical decision making where decisions may be 
subject to debate, negotiation and revision. He considers the sequential 
ordering of the decision making process from the gathering of patient 
information  to  diagnosis  to  treatment  to  be  troublesome.  Even  ‘objective’  
information such as laboratory test findings are the outcome of a process 
of decision making and are themselves judgements mediated by the 
interpretations and values attached to them in collegial discourse 
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(Atkinson, 1995). This body of evidence underscores the dynamic nature 
of medical decision making, the constant revision of diagnostic and 
management decisions in the light of new information, and the falsity in 
trying to ring fence the reasoning process involved in making diagnostic 
decisions as separate from decisions about prescribing or management. 
This suggests that doctors when making decisions which may appear 
overtly management oriented may have made a diagnostic decision using 
rapid non-analytic reasoning to underlie that management decision. 
Equally, it may be that nurse or pharmacist prescribers when acting in 
their role, even as a supplementary prescriber, to make a decision about 
clinical management, may have done the same.  
 
Not all Diagnoses are Created Equal 
 
The previous section explored some of the evidence around the dynamics 
of the clinical reasoning process and how diagnostic decisions are deeply 
intertwined with decisions about management. This section will explore a 
range of diagnostic decisions and will argue that it is not, as noted in the 
introduction, that diagnostic decisions are intrinsically more difficult than 
prescribing decisions. Rather there are features, involving complexity and 
uncertainty, which are associated with some clinical decisions (e.g. both 
diagnostic and management) that makes them more difficult or 
challenging for the practitioner to make. 
 
Clinical decisions occur in many contexts and are undertaken by both 
health care professionals and lay people. Self care, in terms of managing 
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minor ailments and long term conditions, is high on the NHS agenda 
(Nazareth & Murray, 2010). Whether clinical reasoning is viewed within an 
analytic or non-analytic framework, the process where an individual 
compares their signs and symptoms with their medical (or lay) knowledge 
of the condition, can be viewed as engaging in a process of diagnostic 
decision making. Bloor and Horrobin (1975) note that patients prior to 
coming to see a doctor are expected to assess their own symptoms and 
seek appropriate self-care, and yet become passive and deferential once 
they enter the surgery. This, the authors suggest, places patients here in 
unique  ‘double  bind’  situation.  Patients  need  to  self  diagnose  their  
symptoms and decide, using their personal knowledge, experience and lay 
referral networks, upon an appropriate course of action. This might 
include self care or a visit to the GP. If the patient decides to seek help 
from the GP, they are then expected to defer to the clinical reasoning and 
course of action decided by the GP. 
 
Community pharmacists undertake a similar cognitive diagnostic process 
to patients when they provide advice and recommend over-the-counter 
medicines in response to patient requests for advice about particular 
symptoms (Tully et al., 1997). Community pharmacists have a well 
described role in managing minor ailments and responding to patient 
symptoms (Hassell et al., 2000). Evidence from cognitive psychology 
suggests that where decisions are routine and repeated often, as in the 
case with customers consulting pharmacists about common situations 
needing minor ailment advice, they are easier as they require less effort 
and little deliberation (Lehto & Nah, 2006). The cognitive load or burden 
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associated with a decision is also less when the presenting information 
has already been organised into schemata and stored in long term 
memory (van Merrienboër & Sweller, 2005). Such schemata reduce the 
burden on working memory which is both capacity and time limited. In 
clinical practice the storage of complex schemata is likely to be aided by 
previous exposure to protocols, guidelines or flow diagrams which exist for 
many clinical conditions and help organise incoming information. When a 
customer requests advice on a common minor ailment, familiarity and 
existing protocols and procedures relevant to the encounter are likely to 
reduce  the  cognitive  load  on  the  pharmacist’s  decision  making  process.  
Also potentially influencing the effort required is that decisions regarding 
minor ailments involve an acute self-limiting condition, and thus involve 
minimal uncertainty about the outcome (e.g. the patient is likely to get 
better regardless).  
 
These  ‘easier’  diagnostic  decisions  can  also  occur  with  some  chronic  
conditions such as hypertension. Current guidance from the British 
Hypertension Society and the National Institute for Health and Clinical 
Excellence states that a diagnosis of uncomplicated hypertension is made 
when three readings above 140/90mm Hg are obtained on three separate 
visits (National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence, 2006). Lifestyle 
or pharmacological interventions may be initiated, depending upon the 
patient’s  level  of  cardiovascular  risk.  This,  like  the  example  above,  relies  
on an existing schemata (a hypertension guideline) which helps organise 
presenting information and exerts less cognitive load on working memory 
(van Merrienboër & Sweller, 2005). An increasing number of novel 
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elements to process increase the burden on working memory and makes 
decision making more difficult. Uncertainty is also one of the primary 
reasons why decisions can be difficult (Lehto & Nah, 2006). As described 
by Light (1979), there are different kinds of uncertainty: that arising from 
incomplete mastery of knowledge, that arising from indeterminacy of the 
clinical area itself and, as noted by Fox (1957), not being able to 
determine the difference between imperfect mastery of available 
knowledge and imperfections in the knowledge in the clinical area itself. 
Uncertainty can be exacerbated when there is complexity, for example 
when there is a lack of clarity in terms of patient presentation (e.g. 
atypical patient presentation or lack of symptom specificity to a particular 
illness) and / or increased complexity of the patient situation (e.g. the 
presence of co-morbidities or a complicated patient social situation). 
Increasing uncertainty and complexity require greater deliberation and 
impose  a  greater  cognitive  load  on  a  practitioner’s  decision  making.  This  
may lead to the practitioner seeking additional information from the 
patient or to use the cognitive biases or heuristics described earlier 
(Round, 2000; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Intuitive decisions made 
under conditions of uncertainty are prone to cognitive biases and may 
lead to error (Norman, et al., 2009; Hall, 2002).  
 
A Threat to Medical Dominance? 
 
The arguments put forward so far have suggested that the process of 
making diagnostic and treatment decisions are intertwined within the 
process of clinical reasoning and are not separable as distinct reasoning 
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entities. Further that it is not diagnosis itself that is difficult but rather 
clinical decisions, both diagnostic and management, that involve greater 
complexity and uncertainty which are the more cognitively challenging. In 
considering the reasons why doctors may consider diagnostic decision 
making to be superior to other forms of clinical reasoning, one obvious 
interpretation is that they feel threatened by the expansion of nurses and 
pharmacists into prescribing roles. They wish to maintain control over 
diagnostic decision making so they can retain control over the prescribing 
process.  Analogous  to  Pope’s  argument  on  medicine’s  response  to  the  
evidence  based  medicine  movement  (Pope,  2003),  medicine’s  response to 
new  prescribers’  expansion  into  diagnostic  decision  making  could  be  
viewed  as  a  ‘last  stand’  and  wish  to  maintain  power  in  the  face  of  external  
threats.  
 
Abbott (1988) discusses how professionals, such as nurse and pharmacist 
prescribers, make jurisdictional claims to an area of practice previously 
under full jurisdictional control of the medical profession. As independent 
prescribers, nurses and pharmacists can be seen as making a 
jurisdictional claim to engage in diagnostic decision making. The outcome 
of such jurisdictional claims is mediated through interactions between the 
various stakeholders at the public, legal or workplace level (Abbott, 
1988). The public outcry by doctors regarding diagnostic decision making 
may reflect their desire to maintain their jurisdictional boundaries, done in 
a manner designed to enlist the support of the wider public. Equally, 
nurses and pharmacists, under the dominance of medicine, may feel 
uncomfortable encroaching on territory identified with doctors and may 
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self-limit their areas of practice by indicating their unwillingness to engage 
in diagnoses (Bissell et al., 2008, Weiss et al., 2006, Lloyd & Hughes, 
2007). 
 
Previous researchers have investigated the threat posed by nurse and 
pharmacist prescribers (Fisher, 2010, Weiss & Sutton, 2009, Cooper et. 
al., 2011). These researchers concluded that power relationships still 
played a part and that the dominance of medicine has not been 
threatened. Allsop (2006) has suggested that medicine has 
accommodated to change resulting from the introduction of new 
prescribers and has maintained overall control of patient management. 
Cooper et al. (2011), in their evaluation of nurse and pharmacist 
supplementary prescribing, identified five ways of working which 
supported the continued dominance of medicine. These included:  
patients’  and  supplementary  prescribers’  views  of  doctors  as  being  
hierarchically  superior;;  doctors’  initial  legitimation  of  nurses’  and  
pharmacists’  prescribing;;  doctors’  belief  that  they  could  control,  
particularly  nurse,  prescribers’  access  to  training;;  nurse  and  pharmacist  
prescribers’  frequent  recourse  to  seeking  advice  from  doctors  (and  
doctors’  encouragement  of  this);;  and  doctors’  denigration  of  most  routine  
prescribing, making it therefore more suitable for nurses and pharmacists 
to undertake (Cooper et al., 2011). However, this study and the previous 
studies have only explored the dominance of medicine under 
supplementary prescribing arrangements (or earlier nurse prescribing 
arrangements). With the introduction of independent prescribing, and the 
more explicit possibility for nurses and pharmacists to make diagnoses, 
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doctors may indeed feel under threat especially when, under pressure 
from supplementary prescribing, doctors made much of the skill and 
defining nature of diagnosing as key to their role (Cooper et al., 2011).     
  
Developing Expertise 
 
Nonetheless, it is important to consider the evidence regarding 
pharmacists’  and  nurses’  ability  to  diagnose  and  prescribe,  and  whether  
they are safe prescribers.  In  Latter  et  al.’s  (2007)  study  of  the  clinical  
appropriateness of nurse prescribing, nurses were found to be generally 
making clinically appropriate decisions. However some negative comments 
were made by the medical doctors on the expert panel which questioned 
nurses’  assessment  and  diagnosing  skills.  However,  the  method  used  
annotated transcripts of nurse consultations and some examples of 
incomplete assessment may have been because nurses did not verbalise 
their assessments. Concerns have been expressed  about  nurses’  
knowledge of pharmacology (Morrison-Griffiths et al., 2002, Buckley et 
al.,  2006,  Offredy  et  al.,  2008,  Cooper  et  al.,  2008),  pharmacists’  lack  of  
training in clinical examination skills and diagnoses (Weiss et al., 2006, 
Hoti et al., 2010, Cooper et al., 2008), variations in the preparation and 
academic qualifications of nurses going on prescribing courses (Latter & 
Courtenay,  2004)  and  pharmacists’  lack  of  contact  with  patients  (Buckley  
et al., 2006, Child et al., 1998). However, there is also some evidence, 
although not extensive, supporting the decision making skills of nurses 
and pharmacists. In addition to the study above (Latter et al., 2007), 
other research has found that nurses wrote prescriptions to a high 
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standard with most prescriptions determined to be appropriately and 
safely prescribed (Drennan et al., 2009). In their assessment of the safety 
and appropriateness of nurse and pharmacist prescribing, no errors were 
identified across the 71 medicines prescribed and prescriptions were 
judged overall to be appropriate (Bissell et al., 2008). The clinical 
effectiveness and costs of mental health nurse supplementary prescribers 
compared  with  psychiatrists’  prescribing,  similarly  found  no  difference  
between the two groups (Norman et al., 2010). Evidence also suggests 
that nurse and pharmacist prescribers, in comparison with doctors, are 
more likely to adhere to guidelines (Shulman & Jani, 2005, MacDonald et 
al., 2005).  
 
Underlying  nurses’  and  pharmacists’  performance  as  prescribers is their 
training which has a strong emphasis on competence. The first required 
learning outcome for pharmacist prescribing courses states independent 
pharmacist prescribers should be able to: 
 
‘Understand the responsibility that the role of independent prescriber 
entails, be aware of their own limitations, and work within the limits 
of their professional competence – knowing when and how to refer / 
consult / seek guidance from another member of the health care 
team’  (General  Pharmaceutical  Council,  2010,  pp.1). 
 
In nursing, section 2, practice standard 2.2 of the Standards for 
Prescribing  Practice  states  that  ‘you must only ever prescribe within your 
level  of  experience  and  competence’ (Nursing & Midwifery Council, 2010, 
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pp.29). The emphasis put upon competence, coupled with the dominance 
of a patient safety agenda within the culture of the NHS, has meant that 
self-limitation and restraint in terms of breadth of prescribing, has become 
a professional ideal for some new prescribers (Weiss & Sutton, 2009). 
Restrictions to the range of clinical areas in which prescribing occurs and 
the use of protocols to guide prescribing decisions facilitate new 
prescribers’  competence  in  their  areas  of  practice.  This  also  makes  
possible  the  development  of  doctors’  overseer  role in patient 
management,  helps  maintain  doctors’  overall  control  over  the  prescribing  
process and preserves their higher status (Allsop, 2006). However with 
the maturation of nurse and pharmacist prescribing and the potential for 
their expertise to develop, as well as anecdotal examples of nurses and 
pharmacists who have expanded their areas of practice (Young, 2005, 
Anonymous, 2004, Anonymous, 2009, Coombes, 2008, Tomlin, 2009, 
Sibbald, 2008), it  is  uncertain  how  long  doctors’  control  over  patient  
management will be maintained.  
 
The traditional approach to medical clinical teaching, and the development 
of diagnostic expertise, consists of two stages: mastery of basic 
biomedical sciences followed by the assessment of patient clinical 
problems (Eva, 2004). Experience, following on from medical training, is 
recognised as important to the development of expertise. As noted by 
Freidson  (1970),  medical  knowledge  is  justified  in  terms  of  the  doctor’s  
personal knowledge and their professional experience. This practical 
reasoning is resistant to change on the basis of abstractions or statistical 
considerations (Freidson, 1970). Clinical experience is seen as an 
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important source of control over uncertainty, with the ultimate respect 
given to judgement based on experience (Light, 1979). Increasing age, 
correlating with increasing expertise, has been shown to increase reliance 
on non-analytic clinical reasoning (Elstad et al., 2010), with GPs identified 
as diagnostic experts relying on relatively few elements of clinical data 
(Groves et al., 2003).  
 
The importance and salience of experience has been contested in more 
recent years with the work of Archie Cochrane, David Sackett and the rise 
of evidence-based medicine (EBM). Cochrane supported the use of 
randomised controlled trials, where appropriate, to test the effectiveness 
of medical interventions and for these findings to guide clinical decision 
making (Cochrane, 1972). The emphasis on identifying, appraising and 
implementing relevant clinical research into individual patient 
management situations was further refined by David Sackett and central 
to the evidence-based medicine movement (Sackett et al., 1996). What 
the evidence based movement proposed was that clinical experience may 
not be the best method of developing expertise and that EBM with its 
‘conscientious,  explicit  and  judicious  use  of  current  best  evidence’  in  
making decisions about patients (Sackett et al., 1996, pp.71), is a more 
robust method of developing clinical expertise.  
 
Ericsson and Towne (2010) take a cognitive psychology approach to the 
study of expertise. They describe two distinct perspectives, one of which 
is the traditional approach, or accumulated experience model, where 
expertise is developed through increased training and experience over a 
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period of years. This model has been criticised because the relationship 
between increasing experience does not correlate in a linear fashion with 
increasing expertise. At a certain point, performance reaches a level of 
automaticity and is effortless, and increasing experience will not improve 
accuracy further. The second approach, called expert performance, 
focuses on individuals who have superior performance at reproducible 
tasks that capture the expertise representative of a particular domain 
such as medicine. In this model, experts, such as doctors, have superior 
anticipation skills and more refined cognitive representations which enable 
them to access and execute appropriate actions quickly. These 
representations are stored in long-term memory but, because they can be 
rapidly accessed like short term working memory yet are not likewise 
capacity-limited, this storage / retrieval aspect of memory has been called 
long term working memory. Most intriguingly, this expert performance 
approach can be enhanced through  ‘deliberate  practice’  where  an  
individual intensely concentrates on a specific aspect of performance 
which leads to modification of the mechanisms responsible for 
improvement. In this model, informative feedback and coaching are key 
to the development of expertise. In medicine this could include expert 
performers working through descriptions of previous diagnostic situations 
where the correct outcome is known so that they receive immediate 
feedback on the accuracy of their decisions (Ericsson & Towne, 2010). 
 
In contrast to the medical training model of the learning of basic sciences 
followed by engagement with patient clinical problems, the nurse and 
pharmacist prescribing training model emphasises competence. This 
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emphasis on competence is at least in part necessary due to the diverse 
knowledge, qualifications and experiences of the nurses and pharmacists 
who may decide to become prescribers. For the development of further 
expertise, evidence suggests that for nurse and pharmacist prescribing to 
succeed, they need support from peers (through professional networks, 
multidisciplinary working and collaborative practice), they need good 
mentorship arrangements with doctors and they need to have access to 
continuous professional development (Cooper et al., 2008, Weiss et al., 
2006, Stewart et al., 2009, Carey, et al. 2009, Otway, 2001, Bradley et 
al., 2007). Alongside these, the methods for developing expertise 
previously mentioned including increased clinical experience, use of tools 
derived from evidence-based medicine, and enhancement through 
‘deliberate  practice’  are  also  likely  to  play  a  role.   
 
Medical educators have similarly recognised that there might be a number 
of routes for developing expertise (Eva, 2004). Eva (2004) suggests that 
there might be several strategies for developing diagnostic expertise such 
as accumulating a mental database of patient cases, obtaining experience 
with a diverse range of diagnostic categories and identifying similarities in 
the underlying concepts of superficially distinct problems. These strategies 
bear  similarity  to  Ericsson  and  Towne’s  (2010)  notion  of  ‘deliberate  
practice’  where  diagnostic  skill  is  gained  through  concentration  on  specific  
aspects of diagnostic performance and the development of refined 
cognitive representations stored in long term working memory. As 
discussed by Eva (2004), while the learning of basic science mechanisms 
contributes towards making accurate diagnoses, it may not be the only 
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way of doing so. For nurse and pharmacist prescribers to develop 
diagnostic expertise, it is likely that a range of approaches, which may 
include newer ideas such as the use of deliberate practice, will be shown 
to be effective in enhancing diagnostic performance. Independent 
prescribing by nurses and pharmacists is still a relatively new 
phenomenon and new prescribers need time to mature and develop in 
their roles. Given the starting point of new prescribers, further research is 
needed on what methods or combination of methods, derived from 
medical training, medical practice or cognitive psychology, are most 
effective in enhancing their diagnostic skill.   
 
Conclusions   
 
Clinical reasoning underlies all types of clinical decisions including 
diagnostic decisions, as well as prescribing decisions, referral decisions or 
other decisions about patient management. Previous research suggests 
that diagnostic decisions are deeply intertwined with decisions about 
management, using the same clinical reasoning processes. In addition, 
everyone, when they are confronted with having to manage new 
symptoms, make diagnostic decisions. This suggests that privileging 
diagnostic decision making as being superior to, or more difficult than, 
prescribing decision making is conceptually flawed. This is not to say there 
are not difficult diagnostic and patient management decisions. Rather 
there are features, involving complexity and uncertainty, which are 
associated with some clinical decisions (e.g. both diagnostic and 
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management) that makes them more difficult or challenging for a 
practitioner to make. 
 
The  medical  profession’s  response  to  nurse  and  pharmacist  independent  
prescribing  could  be  viewed  as  a  ‘last  stand’  and  wish  to  maintain  their  
professional power in the face of external threats. Independent 
prescribing explicitly allows for the possibility for nurses and pharmacists 
to  make  diagnoses.  Indeed,  doctors’  perception  of    this  professional  threat  
may have been exacerbated by their earlier response to supplementary 
prescribing, when they denigrated the routine nature of the prescribing 
undertaken by pharmacists and nurses, and made much of the skill and 
defining nature of diagnosing. Although ostensibly concerned about the 
risks to public safety of nurse and pharmacist independent prescribing, 
the evidence to date, although not extensive, suggests that nurses and 
pharmacists can prescribe safely and appropriately.  
 
The model for training nurse and pharmacist prescribers relies on their 
recognition of their areas of competence and to prescribe only within 
these clinical areas. Protocols and guidelines may be helpful in supporting 
new  prescribers’  decision  making,  particularly  when  they  are  new  to  their  
role, less confident and are able to use guidelines to help organise the 
incoming patient clinical information. However, as new independent 
prescribers mature in their role and as independent prescribing becomes 
more commonplace, consideration needs to be given as to how to develop 
the diagnostic expertise of nurse and pharmacist prescribers. The 
traditional medical model of learning basic science mechanisms followed 
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by engagement with patient clinical problems is one approach to learning 
how to make accurate diagnoses. But it may not be the only way. Indeed, 
research suggests that diagnostic performance can be enhanced through 
‘deliberate  practice’  whereby  an  individual  intensely  concentrates  on  a  
specific aspect of performance and, through feedback and coaching, is 
able to improve their diagnostic accuracy. Further research is needed to 
determine if such an approach will prove effective in developing the 
expertise of nurses and pharmacists in diagnosing. In conclusion, the 
question becomes, not can pharmacist and nurse prescribers make 
diagnoses, because clearly they already do. Rather the question is, is it 
possible for nurse and pharmacist prescribers to develop expertise and 
become expert diagnosticians? The answer to this surely is a cautious 
‘yes’. 
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